i-am-out-of-office-and-will-be-back-on-10-sep.
我走出办公室，将于9月10
此结果来自百度翻译，长句或段落建议您使用
1. For more information concerning the club contact I. Coldwell.
咨询俱乐部详情，请与I.科德维尔联系。
来自柯林斯例句
2. If you invert " I can " , you have " can I ".
如果你把Ican两词前后颠倒一下,就成了 can I.
来自《简明英汉词典》
3. You should correct the small letter i to capital letter I.
你应该把小写的i改为大写的I.
来自《简明英汉词典》
4. English has hurt me a thousand times, but I still regard it as my first love.
英语伤我千百遍，我待英语如初恋。
来自金山词霸 每日一句
5. I thought I'd enrol you with an art group at the school.
我想我会吸收你参加学校的一个艺术团。
来自柯林斯例句
0){var rand = parseInt(Math.random() * (000)+100000);top.location.href='/'+encodeURIComponent(document.getElementById('s').value.trim().replace( / /g, '_'))+'?renovate='+}else{top.location.href='/'+encodeURIComponent(document.getElementById('s').value.trim().replace( / /g, '_'));};}" action="/">
查过的词自动加入生词本
Tip：此功能设置只能在登录状态下生效
i-am-out-of-office-and-will-be-back-on-10-sep.
需要改进的内容：
单词大小写
其他（请在下面补充描述）
错误描述：
您还可在这里补充说明下 O(∩_∩)O~
方便的话，请您留下一种联系方式，便于问题的解决：back-to -school sale 是什么意思_百度知道
back-to -school sale 是什么意思
我有更好的答案
按默认排序
开学减价大甩卖In my neighborhood, the local gun-shop had a back-to-school sale. The high school newspaper had an obituary column.我们家附近的枪店有开学减价大甩卖。中学的校报里有个讣告栏。
就是我们俗说的“开学大减价”或者“开学大甩卖”了哈有什么问题我们可以继续讨论的哟！~望采纳~谢谢！
校园岁月展销。。。
バック·トゥ·スクール贩売
其他类似问题
sale的相关知识
您可能关注的推广
等待您来回答
下载知道APP
随时随地咨询
出门在外也不愁美国证券法典型案例（中英文）－证券交易委员会诉爱德华兹案
S.E.C. v. Edwards
389, 124 S.Ct. 892
U.S.,2004.
Justice O,CONNOR delivered the opinion of
the Court.
“Opportunity
doesn,t always knock ... sometimes it rings.” App. 113 (ETS
Payphones promotional brochure). And sometimes it hangs up. So it
did for the 10,000 people who invested a total of $300 million in
the payphone sale-and-leaseback arrangements touted by respondent
under that slogan. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
argues that the arrangements were investment contracts, and thus
were subject to regulation under the federal securities laws. In
this case, we must decide whether a moneymaking scheme is excluded
from the term “investment contract” simply because the scheme
offered a contractual entitlement to a fixed, rather than a
variable, return.
Respondent
Charles Edwards was the chairman, chief executive officer, and sole
shareholder of ETS Payphones, Inc. (ETS). FN* ETS, acting partly through a subsidiary also
controlled by respondent, sold payphones to the public via
independent distributors. The payphones were offered packaged with
a site lease, a 5-year leaseback and management agreement, and a
buyback agreement. All but a tiny fraction of purchasers chose this
package, although other management options were offered. The
purchase price for the payphone packages was approximately $7,000.
Under the leaseback and management agreement, purchasers received
$82 per month, a 14% annual return. Purchasers were not involved in
the day-to-day operation of the payphones they owned. ETS selected
the site for the phone, installed the *392 equipment, arranged for
connection and long-distance service, collected coin revenues, and
maintained and repaired the phones. Under the buyback agreement,
ETS promised to refund the full purchase price of the package at
the end of the lease or within 180 days of a purchaser,s
FN* Because the Court of Appeals
ordered the complaint dismissed, we treat the case as we would an
appeal from a successful motion to dismiss and accept as true the
allegations in the complaint. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S.
813, 818, 122 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351, 354, 113 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 47
marketing materials and on its Web site, ETS trumpeted the
“incomparable pay phone” as “an exciting business opportunity,” in
which recent deregulation had “open[ed] the door for profits for
individual pay phone owners and operators.” According to ETS,
“[v]ery few business opportunities can offer the potential for
ongoing revenue generation that is available in today,s pay
telephone industry.” App. 114-115 (ETS brochure); id., at
227 **896 (ETS Web site); see id., at 13
(Complaint && 37-38).
The payphones
did not generate enough revenue for ETS to make the payments
required by the leaseback agreements, so the company depended on
funds from new investors to meet its obligations. In September
2000, ETS filed for bankruptcy protection. The SEC brought this
civil enforcement action the same month. It alleged that respondent
and ETS had violated the registration requirements of && 5(a) and
(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 68 Stat. 684, 15 U.S.C. &&
77e(a), (c), the antifraud provisions of both & 17(a) of the
Securities Act of
Stat. , 15 U.S.C. & 77q(a),
and & 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891,
as amended, 114 Stat. , 15 U.S.C. & 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5
thereunder, 17 CFR & 240.10b-5 (2003). The District Court concluded
that the payphone sale-and-leaseback arrangement was an investment
contract within the meaning of, and therefore was subject to, the
federal securities laws. SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 123
F.Supp.2d 1349 (N.D.Ga.2000). The Court of Appeals reversed. 300
F.3d 1281 (C.A.11 2002) (per curiam). It held that
respondent,s scheme was not an investment contract, on two grounds.
First, it read this Court,s opinions to require that an investment
contract offer either capital appreciation *393 or a participation in
the earnings of the enterprise, and thus to exclude schemes, such
as respondent,s, offering a fixed rate of return. Id., at
. Second, it held that our opinions, requirement that the
return on the investment be “derived solely from the efforts of
others” was not satisfied when the purchasers had a contractual
entitlement to the return. Id., at 1285. We conclude that
it erred on both grounds.
“Congress,
purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate
investments, in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called.” Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61, 110 S.Ct. 945, 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990).
To that end, it enacted a broad definition of “security,”
sufficient “to encompass virtually any instrument that might be
sold as an investment.” Ibid. Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. & 77b(a)(1), and & 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. & 78c(a)(10), in slightly different formulations which we
have treated as essentially identical in meaning, Reves,
supra, at 61, n. 1, 110 S.Ct. 945, define “security” to
include “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond,
debenture, ... investment contract, ... [or any] instrument
commonly known as a ‘security.’ ” “Investment contract” is not
itself defined.
The test for whether a particular scheme is an
investment contract was established in our decision in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244
(1946). We look to “whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others.” Id., at 301, 66 S.Ct. 1100. This
definition “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on
the promise of profits.” Id., at 299, 66 S.Ct.
In reaching
that result, we first observed that when Congress included
“investment contract” in the definition of security, it “was using
a term the meaning of which had been *394 crystallized” by the state
courts, interpretation of their “ ‘blue sky’ ” laws. Id.,
at 298, 66 S.Ct. 1100. (Those laws were the precursors to federal
securities regulation and were so named, it **897 seems, because they
were “aimed at promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue
sky in fee simple.’ ” 1 L. Loss & J. Seligman, Securities
Regulation 36, 31-43 (3d ed.1998) (quoting Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36
Can. L. Times 37 (1916)).) The state courts had defined an
investment contract as “a contract or scheme for ‘the placing of
capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income
or profit from its employment,’ ” and had “uniformly applied” that
definition to “a variety of situations where individuals were led
to invest money in a common enterprise with the expectation that
they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the promoter
or [a third party].” Howey, supra, at 298, 66 S.Ct. 1100
(quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn.
52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)). Thus, when we held that
“profits” must “come solely from the efforts of others,” we were
speaking of the profits that investors seek on their investment,
not the profits of the scheme in which they invest. We used
“profits” in the sense of income or return, to include, for
example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value
of the investment.
There is no reason to distinguish between
promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns for
purposes of the test, so understood. In both cases, the investing
public is attracted by representations of investment income, as
purchasers were in this case by ETS, invitation to “ ‘watch the
profits add up.’ ” App. 13 (Complaint & 38). Moreover, investments
pitched as low-risk (such as those offering a “guaranteed” fixed
return) are particularly attractive to individuals more vulnerable
to investment fraud, including older and less sophisticated
investors. See 2 S.Rep. No. 102-261, App., p. 326 (1992) (Staff
Summary of Federal Trade Commission Activities Affecting Older
Consumers). Under the reading respondent advances, unscrupulous
marketers of investments*395 could evade the securities laws by
picking a rate of return to promise. We will not read into the
securities laws a limitation not compelled by the language that
would so undermine the laws, purposes.
Respondent
protests that including investment schemes promising a fixed return
among investment contracts conflicts with our precedent. We
disagree. No distinction between fixed and variable returns was
drawn in the blue sky law cases that the Howey Court used,
in formulating the test, as its evidence of Congress, understanding
of the term. 328 U.S., at 298, and n. 4, 66 S.Ct. 1100. Indeed, two
of those cases involved an investment contract in which a fixed
return was promised. People v. White, 124 Cal.App. 548,
550-551, 12 P.2d
(1932) (agreement between defendant and
investors stated that investor would give defendant $5,000, and
would receive $7,500 from defendant one year later); Stevens v.
Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J.Eq. 61, 62-63, 161 A. 193,
193-194 (1932) (“ironclad contract” offered by defendant to
investors entitled investors to $56 per year for 10 years on
initial investment of $175, ostensibly in sale and leaseback of
breeding rabbits).
None of our
post- Howey decisions is to the contrary. In United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct.
2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975), we considered whether “shares” in a
nonprofit housing cooperative were investment contracts under the
securities laws. We identified the “touchstone” of an investment
contract as “the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others,” and then laid
out two examples of investor interests that we had **898 previously
found to be “profits.” Id., at 852, 95 S.Ct. 2051. Those
were “capital appreciation resulting from the development of the
initial investment” and “participation in earnings resulting from
the use of investors, funds.” Ibid. We contrasted those
examples, in which “the investor is ‘attracted solely by the
prospects of a return’ ” on the investment, with *396 housing
cooperative shares, regarding which the purchaser “is motivated by
a desire to use or consume the item purchased.” Id., at
852-853, 95 S.Ct. 2051 (quoting Howey, supra, at 300, 66
S.Ct. 1100). Thus, Forman supports the commonsense
understanding of “profits” in the Howey test as simply
“financial returns on ... investments.” 421 U.S., at 853, 95 S.Ct.
Concededly,
Forman,s illustrative description of prior decisions on
“profits” appears to have been mistaken for an exclusive list in a
case considering the scope of a different term in the definition of
a security, “note.” See Reves, 494 U.S., at 68, n. 4, 110
S.Ct. 945. But that was a misreading of Forman, and we
will not bind ourselves unnecessarily to passing dictum that would
frustrate Congress, intent to regulate all of the “countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits.” Howey, supra, at 299,
66 S.Ct. 1100.
Given that
respondent,s position is supported neither by the purposes of the
securities laws nor by our precedents, it is no surprise that the
SEC has consistently taken the opposite position, and maintained
that a promise of a fixed return does not preclude a scheme from
being an investment contract. It has done so in formal
adjudications, e.g., In re Abbett, Sommer &
Co., 44 S.E.C. 104, 1969 WL 9) (holding that
mortgage notes, sold with a package of management services and a
promise to repurchase the notes in the event of default, were
investment contracts); see also In re Union Home Loans
(Dec. 16, 1982), 26 S.E.C. Docket
(report and order
regarding settlement, stating that sale of promissory notes secured
by deeds of trust, coupled with management services and providing
investors “a specified percentage return on their investment,” were
investment contracts), and in enforcement actions, e.g.,
SEC v. Universal Service Assn., 106 F.2d 232, 234, 237
(C.A.7 1939) (accepting SEC,s position that an investment scheme
promising “assured profit of 30% per annum with no chance of risk
or loss to the contributor” was a security because it satisfied the
pertinent *397 substance of the Howey test, “
‘[t]he investment of money with the expectation of profit through
the efforts of other persons, ”); see also SEC v. American
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 598, 85 S.Ct. 513, 13
L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (noting that “the SEC advised” the respondent
that its “sale and lease-back arrangements,” in which investors
received “a set 2% of their investment per month for 10 years,”
“were investment contracts and therefore securities” under the 1933
The Eleventh Circuit,s perfunctory alternative
holding, that respondent,s scheme falls outside the definition
because purchasers had a contractual entitlement to a return, is
incorrect and inconsistent with our precedent. We are considering
investment contracts. The fact that investors have
bargained for a return on their investment does not mean that the
return is not also expected to come solely from the efforts of
others. Any other conclusion would conflict with our holding that
an investment contract was offered in Howey itself. 328
U.S., at 295-296, 66 S.Ct. 1100 (service contract entitled
investors to allocation of net profits).
We hold that
an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can be an
**899 “investment contract” and thus a “security”
subject to the federal securities laws. The judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
上诉人查尔斯·爱德华兹，是ETS付费电话公司（简称ETS）的董事长、首席运营官和唯一的股东。ETS（部分通过也由上诉人控制的一子公司）经独立的经销商向公共出售付费电话。出售的付费电话包括安装场所租约、
年回租协议和管理协议、回购协议的一揽子方案。虽然还有其他管理的选择，但投资者中除了一小部分外大都选择了该一揽子方案的安排。一揽子方案付费电话购买价格大约是7000美金，依据回租和管理协议，购买人每月收入82美元，年回报
。购买人对其拥有的付费电话不参与日常运营。ETS选择安装地点，安装设备,安排电话连通和长话服务，收集投币收入和付费电话的日常保持和修理。依照回购计划，ETS承诺租约到期或购买人要求的180天内，返还一揽子计划的购买价格。
在宣传资料和网站上，ETS吹嘘最近的取消管制“为个人付费电话所有者和运营者打开了财路之门”。所以“无以伦比的付费电话”
是 “一个令人心动的商机”。据ETS称：“极少的商业机会能像今天的付费电话产业一样提供持续盈利潜力。”
但付费电话并没有为ETS提供足够的回租协议所需要的收入，所以公司为履行义务，不得不依靠新投资者投入的资金。
【判决意见】
“机会不常有……有时机会就在你眼前。”有时机会也会遇到麻烦。就比如本案涉及的
名投资者在上诉人用以上口号的宣传下向付费电话项目投资了3亿美元，该项目为一项先出售后回租的安排。证券交易委员会认为该安排是投资合同，所以须受联邦证券法律管辖。
<font COLOR="#00年9月，ETS向法院申请破产保护，同月，证券交易委员会提起了民事诉讼，指控上诉人和ETS违反了《1933年证券法》第5节（a）款和（c）款的登记条款，《1933年证券法》第17节（a）款和《1934年证券交易法》第10节(b）款和
规则10b-5 反欺诈条款。联邦地区法院判决付费电话先出售后回租安排属于联邦证券法意指的投资合同，所以受联邦证券法管辖。
上诉法院推翻了该判决。
上诉法院基于以下两条理由认为上诉人的计划不属于投资合同，一、上诉法庭认为本院的意见是要求投资合同必须具备或者资本增值或参与企业利润分红。所以上诉人提供固定回报就排除在外。二、上诉法庭认为本院的意见是要求投资回报必须“完全产生于他人努力”，但并不满足，因为购买人在合同中规定了返还购买的资金。本院认为以上两条理由都站不住脚。
“国会制定证券法的目的是规制投资，而不管投资是什么形式、用什么名称。”为达以上目的，对“证券”作广义解释，可以满足“包括任何事实上为投资目的出售的工具”。
《1933年证券法》
第2节（a）款（1）项和《1934年证券交易法》第3节(a）款（10）项所规定的内容，虽然我们一般认为形式有所不同，但在含义上是一致的。法律把“证券”定义包括“票据，股票，国库券，证券期票，债券，担保债券……投资合同，……或任何被通常认为是证券的工具”。“投资合同”本身并不能确定证券定义。
我们认为，当国会把“投资合同”列入证券定义中时，该词的含义已由州法院在解释它们的“蓝天法”时具体化。州法院这样定义“投资合同”：“投入或投资目的为从其安排中确保收入或利润而进行注资或投入的一种方式。”而且
“一致适用于在完全通过发起人或第三方的努力而获得收益的个人投资于一个通常企业的各种情况”。这样，本院认为“利润”必须“完全从他人努力产生”。我们谈到的利润是投资人基于其投资寻求的，而不是他们投资计划的利润。我们使用“利润”是收入或回报的意思，比如分红，其他定期收入或投资的增加价值。
我们认为没有合理理由为检验目的区分承诺固定回报和承诺变动回报。在两种情况下，投资大众都是为投资回报的描述所吸引，如本案中购买人被ETS邀请
“见证利润上涨”。甚至，把投资宣传为低风险（如保证提供固定回报），对投资欺诈防范能力差的个人（包括年纪大和无经验投资者）尤其具有吸引力。依上诉人提出的看法，卑劣的投资销售商可以假借承诺回报率来逃避证券法的监管。我们不能在理解证券法的时候加一个限制，使法律的目的受到削弱。
上诉人争辩说，把承诺固定回报的投资包含于投资合同会与本院之前判例相冲突。我们不这样认为。审理豪威案的法庭在建立检验方法时使用的蓝天法案例并没有对固定和变动回报作出区分。实际上两种情况都涉及到承诺固定回报的投资合同。
豪威案之后本院的判决也没有相反判例。在United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
案中我们分析非营利住房合作社的“股票”是否是联邦证券法下的投资合同。我们认为投资合同的检验标准为：投资于通常企业并基于其他人运营或管理的努力而产生的对利润的合理预期。还举了两个我们已认为为“利润”的投资者利益的例子。这两个例子为“使用投资者的资金而产生的资本增值”和“参与分配由于使用投资者资金而产生的收益”。我们做一下对比，一个是“投资者完全被投资回报的前景所吸引”，另一个是住房合作社股票，购买人“是因为使用或消费的动机”而购买。所以，福曼案支持豪威案检验方法对“利润”的通常理解，简述为：“基于投资的财务回报……”
很明显，福曼案对之前判决“利润”的解释描述已经被误解，在证券定义下考虑不同术语范围的排他性。但是该意见是对福曼案的误读。本院不会受限于错误措辞而阻碍国会管理所有“层出不穷，变化多端的计划”的目的。
正因为上诉人的观点既得不到证券法目的也得不到本院以往判决的支持,SEC
一直持相反观点，认为承诺固定回报并不能使该计划排除在投资合同之外。SEC 在此之前裁决和执法都持该观点。
第十一巡回法庭因为购买者有合同权利要求返回价款就草率选择判决上诉人的计划不在证券定义之内是错误的，而且和本院之前判例不一致。我们认为是投资合同。投资者经讨价还价得到的投资返回并不意味着该回报不是完全期望他人的努力而获得的。任何其他结论都会和我们在豪威案中认定是投资合同的判决相冲突（投资者有权分享净利润的服务合同）。
本院判决承诺固定回报的投资计划属于“投资合同”。所以，该“证券”属联邦证券法律管辖。联邦上诉法院第十一巡回法庭的判决被撤销，发回本案依本意见进行重审。
美国是判例法国家的代表性国家之一，即使是国会等立法机关制定的成文法也需要通过法院的解释在能够真正发挥作用。为了保护投资者的利益，防止他人逃避证券监管，从事证券欺诈活动，美国法院对国会通过的《1933年证券法》和《1934年证券交易法》进行了很多解释，其中有关证券一词的含义，美国法院赋予“证券”一词相当丰富的内涵和相当广泛的外延，就是“投资合同”也被法院纳入到证券的范畴中。
本案就涉及证券的认定问题。争议双方的争执点是：仅仅因为一项营利计划规定了固定回报权利而不是变动回报，是否可以将其排除在“投资合同”之外。
美国联邦最高法院在 SEC v. W.J.Howey
Co.案的判决中建立了如何判定一个特定计划是投资合同的检验方法：“一项计划是否涉及在普通企业投资资金，而利润来源于他人努力。”该定义“应该赋予灵活解释而不是僵化理解，这样能使其适应管制那些承诺回报利润而利用他人资金的人炮制的层出不穷，变化多端的计划”。因此，在本案中，美国联邦最高法院判决承诺固定回报的投资计划属于“投资合同”，因而应受到联邦证券法的管辖。
已投稿到：
以上网友发言只代表其个人观点，不代表新浪网的观点或立场。}