Google 为何退出中国大陆市场？
我的图书馆
Google 为何退出中国大陆市场？
Eric Schmidt（Google前CEO）在他的书《How Google works》中讲到过这件事情。我刚刚翻出来看了一下。根据书中的内容，大概的时间线是：2004年年中，Google开始考虑进入中国市场。当时中国已有百度和雅虎在做搜索。Google当时已经发现中国的互联网有问题：上来自中国的搜索请求数有时候会突然掉到0，并且那些原本在Google上搜索的用户会被定向到百度的搜索结果页面。于是就会想到可能搞个会给中国用户更好的体验。尽管Sergey表示反对（与其家庭经历有关），但Google很快还是在北京设立了办公室，同时也按照政府的要求对搜索结果进行过滤。在按照政府的要求来进行过滤的那段时间，Google经常被要求屏蔽一些并没有明确违反任何已有法律的内容，有时甚至是某政府部门要求屏蔽另外一个政府部门发表的声明，有时还会是网上的一些谣传。比如CCTV的新大楼刚建好的时候，Google就被要求屏蔽与那幢楼相关的搜索关键字。年，Google中国的流量和收入都稳定增长。2009年12月，Google受到异常复杂并且目的明确的攻击。Sergey组织队伍进行对抗，发现攻击来自中国，目标是窃取Google的源代码，和某些用户的Gmail账户数据，其中包括某些human rights activists和political dissidents。日（周日）下午4点，Sergey在紧急召开的会议上提出不再过滤搜索结果，即使这可能导致被关闭，前几年在中国的努力付诸东流。 几个重量级人物原本的站队是Larry Eric（要）vs Sergey（不要）。但在这次事件后，Larry改主意了。当天晚上9点作出的决定：向公众公布这次黑客攻击事件的细节，并逐步停止上的内容过滤。1月11日（周一），Eric和董事会讨论决定。1月12日（周二），公开决定。之后Google试图和中国政府协商，但没有达成一致。2010年3月，逐步关闭的服务器。用户被重定向到感觉好像我的总结并不是很清楚。于是把重要的事情再列一下：进入中国之前：Eric：中国用户访问会被干扰。所以我们应该搞一个，同时直接配合中国政府的政策，这样能给中国用户更好的体验。Sergey：不行。我们不应该和中国政府发生任何关系。Larry：Eric说得对。于是就有了。2009年12月的事件之后：Sergey：非常坚定的表示，作为对攻击事件的回应，我们应该停止过滤上的结果。（“ Sergey forcefully made the argument that, as a response to the hacker attacks, we should stop complying with government censorship policies.” ）Larry：我觉得Sergey说得对。要不我们还是不过滤了。（在Sergey说服了Larry之后，其他人的意见，哪怕是Eric的，都已经不重要了。当时他们两人的投票权之和是超过半数的。）Eric：我想静静。本答案的所有内容都是书中原文的总结（以英文版为准），其中没有任何我的个人观点。考虑到我还在领着Google的工资，不管我说什么都有屁股决定脑袋的嫌疑，所以还是闭嘴比较好。如果我的总结有什么和原文不符的地方，欢迎指出。（↑抱歉的确有写的不大准确的地方……经提醒已经修改了）以下是原文节选。本书有简体中文（）和繁体中文译本。简体中文版对这一章内容有删节。如果喜欢请购买正版~Decisions—The True Meaning of ConsensusIn December 2009, we learned that Google was under attack from hackers. That we were under some form of attack wasn’t unusual, in fact it happened practically every day. But this time was different. The sophistication of the attack was something we hadn’t experienced before, and so was its objective. A criminal (or, more likely, team of criminals) had somehow found a way to access Google’s corporate servers. Up until then, most bad guys who attacked us were intent on disrupting Google’s services, to shut us down or make it harder for users to access us. This time the bad guys wanted our confidential information.Sergey immediately started working on stopping the attack and figuring out who was perpetrating it and how. In a matter of hours he formed a team of the smartest computer security experts he could find, and gathered them in a nondescript building near our Mountain View headquarters. Over the next couple of weeks, the team set up systems that ultimately allowed them to watch the attacks as they were in progress, and what they found was chilling. The hackers weren’t just stealing intellectual property, but were also trying to access Gmail accounts, including those of human rights activists. And the attacks originated from within the nation with the fastest-growing major economy in the world: China.It was about five and a half years earlier, in mid-2004, that we began to get involved in the Chinese market. From a business standpoint, entering China was not a controversial decision. China was (and is) a huge market, with more people than any other country, tens (now hundreds) of millions of Internet users, and an economy that was growing very quickly. There was a local competitor, Baidu, who had already developed a formidable presence in search, and Yahoo was also gaining momentum. Larry and Sergey visited the country and came away very impressed by all the innovation and energy they witnessed. They had always wanted to hire all the best engineers in the world, and a lot of those engineers were in China.But while the business indicators all pointed to a slam dunk decision to get involved, the don’t-be-evil indicators were much more mixed. Information did not flow freely across the Chinese Internet. We knew this from direct experience: On most days, Chinese citizens were allowed to access our US site, Google.com, and get its unfettered (albeit English) results. But occasionally, Chinese traffic would drop to zero, and people from China trying to get to
would instead be routed to Baidu (and its filtered results). Would opening up a localized site in China be better for the Chinese people, even if we would have to abide by local regulations, or would it make us complicit in the government’s censorship, something that ran counter to the essence of our company’s culture and values? Would establishing ourselves as a local business give us a chance to improve access to information and shed light on the questionable (and nontransparent) practices of the other search providers in China?From the get-go, Sergey Brin was squarely in the “stay out” camp. His family had immigrated to the United States from the Soviet Union when he was a child, so he had firsthand experience with Communist regimes and he didn’t want to support the one in China in any way. But many others on Eric’s staff disagreed, and the business factors—plus the hope of being able to change the information climate in China—tipped the scale in favor of entering. Sukhinder Singh Cassidy, who was running our Asia operations at the time, moved quickly, and within a few months established a Google China subsidiary. We set up a business office in Beijing, and we grudgingly decided to comply with local censorship regulations, but with a twist: We would inform users when results were being blocked. They couldn’t access the censored information, but at least they would be informed that censorship was occurring.One thing that surprised us was that many of the censorship requests we received were intended to suppress links to content that didn’t violate any clear, written law. Sometimes these requests were an attempt to mitigate spats between various government departments (one agency censoring the public statements of another agency) or to suppress scandals that had been planted online. For example, rumors started circulating that the sparkling new Beijing headquarters of CCTV (China Central Television) had a design based on rather salacious images. So we received, and complied with, a request to censor searches related to, among other things, CCTV, genitalia, and porn jokes. (And for all of you who just Googled those terms, (1) shame on you, and (2) we hope you’re not at work!)In January 2006, we launched our localized Chinese site, Google.cn, with in-country servers, and a few months later Eric visited Beijing to promote the site. During one of his press interviews he somehow ended up sitting directly below a framed picture of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. The US press, which was already ambivalent about Google entering China, had a field day with that one. But things went well after that inauspicious beginning: Our local engineers helped the product get much better, and traffic and revenue grew steadily between 2006 and the end of 2009.”With the hacking attacks, all that progress was suddenly in danger. Eric had always believed that engaging in China was not only the right business decision, but the right moral decision as well. While Sergey had always disagreed, Larry had sided with Eric. In light of the attacks, though, Larry was changing his mind. The behavior we were seeing was evil, he told Eric, and wasn’ in fact, the harassment would likely get worse. Eric agreed with this assessment, but was surprised that self-eviction was our answer. Both founders were now firmly against censoring our results on Google.cn.For leaders, decisions are when
there’s a reason why the word “tough” is so often followed by “decision.” (In recent decades it’s also often followed by “love,” but the implementation of that policy is beyond the sphere of this book.) Google’s decision to leave China was emblematic of how we reach decisions, how our process works. Formulating a strategy, hiring the right people, and creating a unique culture are all preliminaries to the fundamental activity of all businesses and business leaders: decision-making.Different institutions take different approaches to decision-making based on their hierarchical structure. The Marines (top-down) keep it simple: One guy gives the ord everyone else takes the hill. “Dammit, there’s only one guy in charge here so put on your helmet and get going.” Most big corporations (bureaucratic) have far more analyses to perform before they can decide the best course of action. Do they have all the data they need? Have the analysts crunched it? Did they calculate pro forma revenues and EBITDA?Weeks go by, the seasons change, and the hill stays before them, untaken. “M the hill is definitely one of our stretch goals.” And in the hip start-up (enlightened), the CEO proclaims that she works for the employees so decisions are made by consensus. “Everyone gets a say and the arguments are collegial, considerate, and last forever. “Let’s everyone go chillax, grab a cappuccino, and meet back here in a half hour to see where we stand, hill-wise.”So who’s right—top-down Marines, bureaucratic corporations, or enlightened start-ups? The pace of business change in the Internet Century dictates that decis the Marines win in that regard. More demanding and informed customers and increased competition dictate that they be as well
the corporations may have an edge there. And having a team of smart creatives dictates that hello, start-ups. So all of them are right, of course. And they are all wrong too.The answer lies in understanding that when it comes to making decisions, you can’t just focus on making the right one. The process by which you reach the decision, the timing of when you reach it, and the way it is implemented are just as important as the decision itself. Blow any of these, and the outcome will likely be negative. And since there’s always another decision to be made, the impact of a poorly executed decision-making process can reverberate past that one issue.As Sergey and his team continued their investigation throughout the latter part of December 2009, Eric knew that one of the most important decisions in the company’s history was at hand. Although he believed that staying in the China market was the best thing for the company, he also knew that both of the founders now disagreed with him. They no longer felt that our presence in the market was helping change government censorship practices, and didn’t want to participate in any way in that censorship. It would be an uphill battle to change their minds, so Eric’s focus shifted. It wasn’t just about making the best decision for the company, but about orchestrating the process so the company reached that decision in the best possible way. There would be other crises and other important decisions, and the smart creatives who populated his staff and ran the company would be paying attention to and learning from how this one was handled. It was especially challenging, given that he was reasonably confident he would disagree with the outcome.Sergey and his investigative team conclusively confirmed the origin and scale of the attack in early January, and the news was bad. Not only were the hackers trying to steal source code, they had also attempted to compromise the Gmail accounts of several Chinese political dissidents. Sergey felt it was important to announce the attack, and how Google would react, very quickly. There was little disagreement on that point. In Eric’s staff meeting that first week of January, Sergey forcefully made the argument that, as a response to the hacker attacks, we should stop complying with government censorship policies. He wanted us to stop filtering search results on Google.cn, even if it meant that the government would likely shut down the site, reversing much of our hard-won progress in the market. He stood up in the meeting
usually Sergey stands in meetings only when he’s wearing his Rollerblades. Eric was traveling that day and attending the meeting via video conference, so he counseled his team to consider all the data and come to the next meeting prepared to express and defend a position on what the company should do.Because of the urgency of the situation, Eric convened the next team meeting for the following Sunday afternoon—January 10, 2010—at four p.m. It started with Sergey conducting a detailed technical review of the situation for well over an hour. He then reiterated the position he had expressed earlier in the week: We should stop filtering our results. Eric knew that Larry was on Sergey’s side, which meant that the decision was effectively made. But it was critically important that all of the members of his team be heard and have a vote. Everyone would have to pull together and rally behind the decision, regardless of where they stood on the matter. So the meeting continued for several hours. We reviewed the facts and had a lengthy, sometimes heated discussion. Finally, Eric called for a vote. The sentiment in the room was clearly favoring Sergey’s position, and the vote wasn’t really necessary, but Eric felt it was important that each person get a chance to record his or her position. Some agreed with Eric that leaving China was tantamount to disengaging from that market for the next hundred years. The majority sided with Sergey, who believed that the Chinese government would eventually change their behavior because their current model would not be sustainable, leaving the door open at some point in the future for Google to reenter the market.The ultimate decision, which the weary team reached around nine p.m. that evening, wasn’t to pull out immediately. Rather, we would disclose the hacking attack with as much tran to the best of our knowledge, of the numerous companies that were affected, we were the only one to go public with the details. And we would announce our plans to stop censoring results on Google.cn. We would not make this change immediately, instead giving ourselves time to—as our lead attorney, David Drummond, put it in the blog post announcing the decision—“[discuss] with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all.” On Monday, Eric discussed the decision with the board, and on Tuesday, January 12, 2010, we announced it publicly.The morning we made the announcement, we got several calls from government officials to our Beijing office wondering if it was some sort of joke. No one does this, one of them told us. Everyone just leaves quietly.We were not leaving quietly. It was a public ultimatum, and Eric had complete clarity on what was going to happen. We would continue to talk with Chinese officials, to see if we could find a solution that was consistent with both our new public position and Chinese law, but that would fail. Google wouldn’t back down from its public stance, and China wouldn’t repeal its laws. So, as expected, in March we took the preordained step of shutting down search on Google.cn. Users visiting that page who tried to perform searches were directed to our site in Hong Kong, Google.com.hk. From that point on, Google search results would be subject to being blocked by the Great Firewall of China. Our traffic dropped precipitously.The TGIF of January 15, 2010, was dominated by discussion of the Chinese issue. Sergey and the security team presented in great detail what had happened, and reviewed the process by which the management team had made its decision. But before he could even get started, Googlers gave the entire senior team a long and thunderous standing ovation. The response from employees in China was of course very different. They feared for their jobs and even their security. Head of Engineering Alan Eustace, along with several dedicated team members in China, was instrumental in steering morale back on track, ensuring that the China team remained safe, engaged, and successful throughout that turbulent time. As a result, the legacy of the China decision was a giant dose of goodwill from Googlers around the world, and the legacy of the thoughtful process by which it was made was the reaffirmation of a set of principles governing how all tough decisions should be made.
TA的最新馆藏[转]&
喜欢该文的人也喜欢Google回归中国时间确定！一声叹息_网易数码
Google回归中国时间确定！一声叹息
用微信扫码二维码
分享至好友和朋友圈
（原标题：Google回归中国时间确定！一声叹息）
据报道，Google已经确定在2016年2月份回归中国，不过不包括搜索业务，只有Google&Play和安卓系统回归，但其全部业务回归应该是可以期望的。时隔六年，互联网格局巨变，似乎所有的互联网领域都被优势的中国互联网企业占据。它还有机会吗？FT中文网用了“一声叹息”来形容。但是，Google还是有很多机会重铸辉煌的，只要政府不再将其驱逐。Google仍旧是全球网络霸主，市值规模5200亿美元，比中国BAT三巨头的市值总和还要多，现金储备近千亿美元，而其市值在最近一年里还大幅上涨，态势蒸蒸日上，非阿里巴巴或腾讯可比。如此强龙，说回到中国就竞争不过本土地头蛇了，未免太悲观。在我看来，Google倘若衰落，那一定是因为两个创始人分裂、去世或者出大事了，否则在布林和佩奇在任时是不会出现问题的。它回到中国，大概还有如下业务能够展开，并取得强势地位。第一，安卓系统付费。Google当初收购摩托罗拉时，曾经保证五年内不能收取专利费，但五年后呢？就未必了，而且当下时限就已经很近。Google当初宣布安卓系统免费，首先是营销需要，还基于它“不作恶”的信条，它不要钱照旧能获利，但必须用Google的搜索服务，然而当下中国安卓手机厂商钻了空子，既不付费又不提供Google搜索。那么安卓系统就未必会免费了。这五年多以来，中国手机厂商已经获得了太多安卓系统免费的好处，已经足够了。血海的智能机竞争已经到了整合阶段，拿来主义毕竟不是长远之计。Google是可以卡他们脖子的，大大促成中国手机厂商的整合。这个指挥棒还是在Google手里，只不过Google此前没有动用而已。是时候向Google回馈利益了。这算不上做恶，虽然Google的信条早就不是“不作恶”了。第二、内置Google&Play，跟Windows系统内置IE一样。否则当下各种互联网公司都推出本地应用商店app的情况下，Google&Play将无任何用武之地，它进来就等于没进来。事实上，Google只让应用商店进来，动机应该不是纯粹为了赚钱，而是要用这个Google&Play加强对生态链的控制，实现集权。自Android&.0之后，Google就一直在寻求改善安卓系统碎片化的状况，收权乃大势所趋。这个策略与微软的盗版策略类似，先放任，待其发展壮大后，再收回，频繁打官司，叫被套牢的厂商必须服从Google的要求。这个要求也是合理的，无论安卓系统的“徒子徒孙”有什么，但“宗主”仍旧是Google。他们的UI都得跟随安卓系统的升级而升级。第三、大数据。Google承诺要将Google&Play的服务器安放在中国，那么其大数据云服务也就能。Google并不想因为牵涉政治信息而被一棍子打死。大数据方面只要肯接受中国政府监管，那么这方面与微软、亚马逊、阿里巴巴等在中国同台竞争都是可能的。唯一的变数是政府的态度——政府到底想把跨国公司定位为什么，是自己的下属机构，还是替欧美利益说话的买办，抑或是政治色彩淡化的国际服务机构。这尚难完全确定。第四、各类创新项目，需知中国厂商最擅长的不过是营销、制造。科技市场的未来仍旧是美日在开辟，中国的科技巨头，到现在也都还处于跟风状态。能取代智能手机的产品，无论是什么，更有可能出现在Google这种公司里，而不是出现在中国的某个制造大厂里，或者营销团队里。但这类产品一旦出现，就会是Google等巨头重夺中国互联网科技霸权的杀手锏。Google从退出中国，再回到中国，这并非是意气之争。Google的态度大概还是依旧——搜索并不进来，说明没谈拢。
Facebook的态度大概也是如此，坚决不肯搞隔离。这是价值观的反映。身外千亿美元级的金融科技巨头，妥协是有限的，可以说Google当下仍旧是“有所为，有所不为”。
本文来源：中关村在线
责任编辑：王晓易_NE0011
用微信扫码二维码
分享至好友和朋友圈
加载更多新闻
热门产品:　　　
:　　　　　　　　
:　　　　　　　　　
热门影院：
阅读下一篇
用微信扫描二维码
分享至好友和朋友圈}